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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 
         Eleazar Morel petitions for review of the decision of 
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) because he was declared 
ineligible to apply for relief from deportation under section 
212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).  Our review 
requires that we consider two legal issues, neither of which this 
circuit has previously addressed: whether the INS erred in 
imposing a requirement of seven consecutive years' domicile after 
the alien was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent 
resident and whether the domicile of a parent may be imputed to 
his or her child in appropriate cases for purposes of meeting the 
seven-year domicile requirement.                                   
                                  
                               I.   
         Morel is a native and citizen of the Dominican 
Republic, born there on June 13, 1972.  He was admitted to the 
United States as a lawful permanent resident on December 20, 
1989 when he was seventeen years old.  He resided in Paterson, 
New Jersey with his mother, who had preceded him to this country 
by approximately four years.   
         Morel was arrested on August 24, 1991, and later pled 
guilty to possession of cocaine, rendering him deportable under 8 
U.S.C.  1251(a)(2)(B)(i).  The Order to Show Cause issued by the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) states, and the 
immigration judge (IJ) found, that Morel was also convicted of 
"employing a juvenile in a drug distribution scheme," App. at 48, 
13, an offense which would be classified as an "aggravated 
felony" for purposes of the immigration laws, see 8 U.S.C.  
1101(a)(43).  However, the state court record is to the contrary.  
The Judgment of Conviction issued by the New Jersey Superior 
Court states that Morel was convicted only of one count of 
possession of a controlled dangerous substance, and that the 
other offense with which Morel was originally charged, possession 
of a controlled dangerous substance within 1,000 feet of school 
property, was dismissed.  App. at 37.  
         After serving his sentence in New Jersey, Morel was 
transferred to an INS detention facility in Oakdale, Louisiana, 
where the INS initiated deportation proceedings.  At a hearing 
held on January 17, 1994, Morel requested relief from deportation 
pursuant to section 212(c) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.  1182(c).  The 
immigration judge denied Morel's request on the ground that he 
did not meet the requirements of section 212(c), and ordered him 
deported to the Dominican Republic.  App. at 24.  On April 10, 
1995, the BIA affirmed the order and dismissed Morel's appeal. 
Morel filed his petition for review to this court on May 11, 
1995. 
         We have plenary review over questions of law, but must 
defer to an agency's reasonable construction of ambiguities in 
the statutes it is charged with administering.  Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
843-45 & n.11 (1984); Katsis v. INS, 997 F.2d 1067, 1069-70 (3d 
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 902 (1944).  We will uphold 
the agency's findings of fact to the extent that they are 
"supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on 
the record considered as a whole."  8 U.S.C.  1105a(a)(4); INS 
v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992).   
                               II. 
         We must first consider a matter of this court's 
jurisdiction, an issue over which we have plenary review.  Caplan 
v. Fellheimer Eichen Braverman & Kaskey, 68 F.3d 828, 834 (3d 
Cir. 1995).  The INS initially filed a motion to dismiss the 
petition for review on the ground that Morel filed his petition 
one day late.  A motions panel of this court referred the matter 
to the merits panel.  However, in the brief the INS subsequently 
filed with us on the merits of the petition for review, it 
conceded that the appeal was timely.  See Appellee's Brief at 1 
("The petition for review was filed on May 11, 1995, and 
therefore is timely under Section 106(a)(1) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 
 1105a(a)(1)").   
         The time for filing a petition for review differs, 
depending on whether the petitioner was convicted of an 
aggravated felony or a lesser offense.   See 8 U.S.C.  
1105a(a)(1) ("[A] petition for review may be filed not later than 
90 days after the date of the issuance of the final deportation 
order, or, in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated 
felony . . . , not later than 30 days after the issuance of such 
order.").  Thus, had Morel been convicted of an "aggravated 
felony," we would indeed lack jurisdiction to consider this 
appeal because Morel did not file his petition for review within 
thirty days, as required in the case of an aggravated felony.  
Although at his deportation hearing Morel's attorney answered 
"yes" to the immigration judge's question "do you admit [the] 
allegations [of the Order to Show Cause] on behalf of your 
client?" and those allegations included the conviction on both 
charges, see App. at 27, 48, Morel now argues that because the 
only crime of which he was convicted, drug possession, is not an 
aggravated felony under the INA, the 90-day time limit governs 
and his petition for review was timely filed. 
         In response to an inquiry from this court following 
oral argument, the INS once again reversed its position on the 
issue of our jurisdiction.  It now insists that Morel's appeal is 
untimely, and that he is estopped from asserting that he was not 
convicted of an aggravated felony because he conceded this point 
at his deportation hearing.  We are not persuaded that this is an 
appropriate case for estoppel. 
         Because Morel would have been deportable for possession 
of a controlled substance, there was no reason for Morel to have 
focused on whether he had also been convicted of any other charge 
at the deportation hearing.  Morel could not then have 
anticipated that conviction of an aggravated felony would later 
become relevant to the timeliness of his petition to this court.  
Therefore, we will not now estop him from arguing that he was not 
convicted of an aggravated felony.  See Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments  27, 28(2)(a) & (5)(b)(1980) (issue preclusion 
successfully invoked only when issue was actually litigated and 
essential to previous judgment, and not when issue's reappearance 
involves substantially unrelated claim or was not sufficiently 
foreseeable). 
         The judgment of conviction in Morel's criminal case 
clearly shows that he was convicted only of drug possession, seeApp. at 
37, and the government does not argue otherwise.  That 
offense is not an aggravated felony under the immigration laws.  
To the extent the IJ should be viewed as having made a factual 
finding that Morel was convicted of an aggravated felony, that 
finding was not supported by substantial evidence. It follows 
that Morel had 90 days within which to file his notice of appeal 
under 8 U.S.C.  1105a(a)(1), and accordingly his appeal is 
timely. 
         The INS does not dispute that venue is proper in this 
court, although this is an appeal from the BIA in Louisiana. 
Under the applicable statute, a petitioner may seek judicial 
review in either the circuit in which the hearing took place or 
the circuit of his residence.  8 U.S.C.  1105a(a)(2).  Morel's 
residence prior to his arrest was in Paterson, New Jersey, and 
apparently he returned to his home in New Jersey following his 
release from INS custody.  
           The INS nonetheless suggests that this court should 
review the reasonableness of the BIA's decision in light of  
Fifth Circuit law, because that was the jurisdiction in which the 
case arose.  While it may be anomalous that there could be 
differing circuit law governing a federal agency's application of 
a uniformly applicable federal statute where two circuits have 
potential connection with the case, all of the other appellate 
courts confronted with a similar situation have applied the law 
of their own circuits.  See Rosendo-Ramirez v. INS, 32 F.3d 1085, 
1091-94 (7th Cir. 1994)(holding court was obliged to apply its 
own law despite problems created by lack of uniformity in 
application of immigration laws); Maldonado-Cruz v. Dept. of Imm. 
& Naturalization, 883 F.2d 788, 790-91 (9th Cir. 1989)(applying 
Ninth Circuit law where alien's detention and hearings occurred 
in Fifth Circuit based on "the general policy of preventing forum 
shopping by the INS" and fact that alien's only contact with 
Fifth Circuit was his detention there).  We will likewise apply 
the law of our own jurisdiction. 
 
                               III. 
                                A. 
         At issue in this appeal is whether the BIA erred in 
determining that Morel was ineligible for a waiver of 
inadmissibility under section 212(c) of the INA.  Section 212(a) 
identifies those classes of aliens who are ineligible to receive 
visas and are excluded from admission to the United States.  
Section 212(c), however, authorizes the Attorney General to waive 
the restrictions of section 212(a) where an alien satisfies 
certain conditions.  That section provides: 
 
         Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who 
         temporarily proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under 
         an order of deportation, and who are returning to a 
         lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive 
         years, may be admitted in the discretion of the 
         Attorney General . . . .  
8 U.S.C.  1182(c).   
         We note in passing that the language of section 212(c) 
appears on its face to apply only to aliens who seek to re-enter 
the country.  Nonetheless, the provision has been uniformly 
extended to apply to deportation proceedings as well.  SeeKatsis v. INS, 
997 F.2d 1067, 1070 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 
114 S.Ct. 902 (1994); Tapia-Awna v. INS, 640 F.2d 223, 224-25 
(9th Cir. 1981); Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268, 271-73 (2d Cir. 
1976); Matter of Silva, 16 I & N Dec. 26, 30 (BIA 1976).  Even if 
we were inclined to reconsider this issue, we are bound by our 
previous determination in Katsis that we would follow the uniform 
construction.  Moreover, we note that the INS does not now 
dispute the applicability of section 212(c) to deportation 
proceedings, and thus this issue is not before us.  Instead, we 
turn to Morel's challenge to the BIA's ruling.  
                                B. 
         Morel's argument is twofold.  First, he contends that 
the BIA has erroneously interpreted section 212(c) to require 
seven years of domicile subsequent to admission as a lawful 
permanent resident, a requirement Morel maintains is not imposed 
by the statute.  Second, although Morel concedes that he had not 
resided in this country for seven consecutive years at the time 
of his deportation hearing, he contends that the domicile of his 
mother, who he claims became a permanent resident on May 27, 
1985, should be attributed to him for the period before he joined 
her in 1989.  He bases the latter argument on the accepted 
common-law principle that a minor child's domicile is that of his 
or her parent.  
         The IJ recognized that Morel claimed the requisite 
domicile based on his mother's permanent resident status, but 
held that "the respondent is not eligible for the relief in this 
Circuit or in this Court of 212(c) waiver based upon his mother's 
date of the issuance of the green card.  Therefore, it has not 
[sic] choice."  App. at 24.  The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision 
and dismissed the appeal in a per curiam opinion.  The BIA noted 
that the Fifth Circuit had not addressed the imputation-of- 
domicile issue, and expressly declined to apply the reasoning of 
the other courts which had imputed the domicile of a parent to 
the parent's minor child for purposes of determining whether the 
child had satisfied the seven-year domicile requirement of 
section 212(c).  App. at 3 n.1.  Of course, the possibility of 
imputing a parent's domicile to his or her child will ordinarily 
be relevant only if the BIA erred in its reading of section 
212(c) as requiring seven years of permanent residency status.  
Thus, we turn to the latter issue first.  
                                C. 
         While the BIA has long held that the seven years of 
domicile required by section 212(c) must follow admission as a 
lawful permanent resident, see Matter of S., 5 I & N Dec. 116, 
117-18 (BIA 1953), the courts of appeals have read the statute 
differently.  It was the Second Circuit that held initially, 
based on both the statutory language and the legislative history, 
that the seven years of domicile need not occur after attainment 
of permanent residency status.  See Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37, 39- 
41 (2d Cir. 1977).  Recently, the Seventh Circuit has agreed with 
the Second Circuit's approach.  See Castellon-Contreras v. INS, 
45 F.3d 149, 152-54 (7th Cir. 1995).  Just this year, the Fifth 
Circuit ruled in accord with the Second and Seventh Circuits on 
this issue.  See White v. INS, 75 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 1996). 
         The Ninth Circuit has wavered.  In Castillo-Felix v. 
INS, 601 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1979), it deferred to the BIA's 
interpretation, but it has since modified this position somewhat, 
creating an exception for children of aliens in a case analogous 
to this one, see Lepe-Guitron v. INS, 16 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 
1994) (holding that aliens who, as minor children, lived with 
permanent resident parents before independently attaining 
permanent resident status may count that period toward section 
212(c)'s seven-year domicile requirement).  Most recently, that 
court held that aliens granted temporary resident status under 
the amnesty provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act 
of 1986, 8 U.S.C.  1255a, may count the period as a temporary 
resident toward the seven-year domicile requirement.  Section 
212(c), Ortega de Robles v. INS, 58 F.3d 1355 (9th Cir. 1995).  
         The Fourth Circuit is the only court of appeals to have 
accepted the BIA's interpretation of section 212(c) in all 
respects.  See Chiravacharadhikul v. INS, 645 F.2d 248 (4th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981).  When this issue 
previously arose before us, we recognized the differing 
interpretations but declined to resolve the issue at that time.  
See Graham v. INS, 998 F.2d 194, 195 (3d Cir. 1993). In this 
case, the matter is squarely before us. 
         Morel's argument, and one which the government has 
never satisfactorily answered in this case, is based on the 
distinction made in the statute itself between "admi[ssion] for 
permanent residence" and "lawful . . . domicile."  The INA 
defines "lawfully admitted for permanent residence" as "the 
status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing 
permanently in the United States as an immigrant in accordance 
with the immigration laws, such status not having changed."  8 
U.S.C.  1101(a)(20).  The INA does not define "domicile," but 
the term is ordinarily understood to mean physical presence with 
an intent to remain in that place indefinitely.  See Mississippi 
Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 48 (1989); 
Graham, 998 F.2d at 195.  Therefore, in order for an alien to 
establish a "lawful" domicile, the alien must be legally capable 
of forming an intent to remain in the United States indefinitely.  
See Castellon-Contreras, 45 F.3d at 153. 
         Aliens such as those admitted as temporary visitors, 
students or workers may not lawfully form an intent to remain in 
the United States because they have visas that require that the 
holder have "a residence in a foreign country which he has no 
intention of abandoning."  8 U.S.C.  1101(a)(15).  This excludes 
them as lawful "domiciliaries."  See Graham, 998 F.2d at 196;  
see also Melian v. INS, 987 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 
1993)(alien on temporary visitor visa cannot lawfully establish 
intent to remain since maintenance of foreign domicile required); 
Brown v. INS, 856 F.2d 728, 731 (5th Cir. 1988)(alien on student 
visa cannot lawfully establish intent to remain since maintenance 
of foreign domicile required); Anwo v. INS, 607 F.2d 435, 437 
(D.C. Cir. 1979)(same).  Likewise, an alien who enters the 
country illegally cannot have a lawful intent to remain here.  
Castellon-Contreras, 45 F.3d at 153.  
         It does not follow that the two statutory phrases - 
admission for permanent residence and lawful domicile - are co- 
extensive.  Certain categories of aliens may lawfully form an 
intent to remain here without having been admitted for permanent 
residence.  For example, aliens holding G-4 visas, which are 
issued to nonimmigrants who are "officers, or employees of . . . 
international organizations [recognized under the International 
Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C.  288-288j], and the 
members of their immediate families," 8 U.S.C.  
1101(a)(15)(G)(iv), may legally intend to remain in this country.  
See Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647, 666 (1978).  Similarly, 
certain foreign businesspersons and investors, see 8 U.S.C.  
1101(a)(15)(E), and refugees granted admission to escape 
persecution in their home countries, see 8 U.S.C.  1101(a)(42), 
may legally establish a domicile in the United States.  The 
Seventh and Ninth Circuits have also noted that aliens granted 
temporary resident status under the amnesty provisions of the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C.  1255a, may 
intend to remain indefinitely in the United States.  See Ortega 
de Robles v. INS, 58 F.3d 1355, 1360-61 (9th Cir. 1995); 
Castellon-Contreras v. INS, 45 F.3d 149, 154 (7th Cir. 1995).  
          The INS concedes that there are categories of aliens 
who may legally intend to remain in the United States without 
being admitted as permanent residents, but nevertheless insists 
that section 212(c) requires seven years of lawful domicile 
following admission as a permanent resident.  But the two 
requirements of section 212(c) are distinct and independent 
conditions.  Nothing in the statute suggests that these 
requirements qualify or limit one another in a way that would 
require that all seven years of "lawful domicile" have been in a 
"permanent resident" status.  See Castellon-Contreras, 45 F.3d at 
153; Rosario v. INS, 962 F.2d 220, 223 (2d Cir. 1992); see alsoMark A. 
Hall, Comment, Lawful Domicile Under Section 212(c) of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act, 47 U. Chi. L. Rev. 771, 775- 
76 (1980).  The INS' interpretation is thus inconsistent with the 
plain reading of the language of section 212(c). 
         The plain language of a statute "should be conclusive, 
except in the `rare cases [in which] the literal application of a 
statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the 
intentions of its drafters.' "  United States v. Ron Pair Enter., 
Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)).  
The plain language of section 212(c) is consistent with its 
purpose, which is to permit application for a waiver of 
deportation for individuals who have established significant ties 
to this country.  See Castellon-Contreras, 45 F.3d at 153 ("[T]he 
plain meaning of the term `lawful unrelinquished domicile' . . . 
. does not lead to either an absurd result, or one at odds with 
Congressional policy.").  Although, as the Lok court noted, the 
legislative history of section 212(c) also supports the more 
liberal interpretation, see 548 F.2d at 40-41 (quoting Senate 
Report excerpt suggesting that Judiciary Committee had considered 
but rejected proposal to limit waiver eligibility to aliens 
accumulating seven years' domicile after admission as permanent 
residents), we need not attempt to construe legislative history 
when the provision itself is clear.  See Blum v. Stenson, 465 
U.S. 886, 896 (1984)("Where . . . resolution of a question of 
federal law turns on a statute and the intention of Congress, we 
look first to the statutory language and then to the legislative 
history if the statutory language is unclear.").   
          
         The INS argues that we should defer to the BIA's 
interpretation under the rule of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), because the 
BIA's position represents that of the agency charged with the 
statute's administration.   Of course we recognize that 
"considerable weight should be accorded to an executive 
department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted 
to administer."   Id. at 844.  However, "[i]f the intent of 
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, 
as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress."  Id. at 842-43. 
         We believe that in this case the intent of Congress is 
explicit, and the BIA's interpretation of section 212(c) is 
manifestly contrary to both the provision's language and purpose.  
By imposing a requirement that an alien have completed the entire 
seven years permanent residency before his or her application for 
relief from deportation may be considered, the BIA has created an 
additional obstacle to relief which Congress did not include in 
the statute.  
                                D. 
         That conclusion leads us to consider whether Morel can 
establish the requisite seven years of lawful domicile by relying 
in part upon the domicile of his mother prior to his reaching the 
age of majority.   We know of only two courts that have directly 
addressed whether the domicile of a parent may be imputed to his 
or her child for determination of the child's eligibility for 
section 212(c) relief, and both have answered this question in 
the affirmative. 
         In Rosario v. INS, 962 F.2d 220 (2d Cir. 1992), the 
court explained that because the legislative history of the INA 
does not define "domicile," it would look to the common-law 
meaning of that term.  Citing Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians 
v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989), the Rosario court concluded 
that "[a] minor's domicile is the same as that of its parents, 
since most children are presumed not legally capable of forming 
the requisite intent to establish their own domicile."  Rosario, 
962 F.2d at 224.    
         Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
in Lepe-Guitron v. INS, 16 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 1994), held that  
children obtaining permanent resident status before reaching 
majority may count their parents' period of lawful domicile 
toward their own.  Although in its earlier decision in Castillo- 
Felix v. INS, 601 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1979), that court had upheld 
the INS interpretation of "lawful unrelinquished domicile as 
accumulating only after the alien acquires permanent residence, 
in Lepe-Guitron the court adopted a more expansive interpretation 
of "domicile" for children.  The court relied upon both the 
common-law notion that a child's domicile follows that of her 
parents and its belief that "section 212(c)'s core policy 
concerns would be directly frustrated by the government's 
proposal to ignore the parent's domicile in determining that of 
the child."  16 F.3d at 1025.   
         The reasoning that guided the courts in Rosario and 
Lepe-Guitron leads us to a similar conclusion.  In Holyfield the 
Supreme Court considered whether children born out of wedlock to 
parents who were members of the Choctaw Indian Tribe and 
residents and domiciliaries of the Choctaw Reservation were 
"domiciled" on that reservation within the meaning of the Indian 
Child Welfare Act, although they had never been physically 
present on the reservation.  The Court concluded that the 
children were in fact domiciliaries of the reservation, based on 
the generally accepted meaning of the term "domicile" and because 
applying that definition would be consistent with the purpose of 
the statute.  In light of the fact that Congress had neither 
defined "domicile" in the Indian Child Welfare Act nor 
demonstrated an intent that its definition should be a matter of 
state law, the Court "start[ed] with the assumption that the 
legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the 
words used," viewed "in the light of the object and policy of the 
statute."  490 U.S. at 47 (citations omitted). 
          The Holyfield court explained that for adults, 
domicile is established by physical presence in a particular 
place plus an intent to remain there.  Id. at 48.  One acquires a 
"domicile of origin" at birth, and retains that domicile until 
s/he chooses a new one.  However, because "most minors are 
legally incapable of forming the requisite intent to establish a 
domicile, their domicile is determined by that of their parents."  
Id.  Thus, it follows that "[o]n occasion, a child's domicile of 
origin will be in a place where the child has never been."  Id.(quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws  14 cmt. b 
(1988)). 
            Based on the reasoning in Holyfield, we too conclude 
that the domicile of a parent may be imputed to his or her child 
for purposes of determining whether the child has met the seven 
year domicile requirement of section 212(c).  As with the Indian 
Child Welfare Act construed in Holyfield, Congress neither 
defined "domicile" in the INA nor indicated that it should be 
interpreted by reference to state law.  Moreover, application of 
the common-law definition of "domicile" here is consistent with 
the "object and policy" of section 212(c), which is to provide 
relief to aliens for whom deportation "would result in peculiar 
or unusual hardship,"  S. Rep. No. 355, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 
(1914)(discussing purpose of the 7th Proviso to section 3 of the 
Immigration Act of 1917, the precursor to section 212(c)). 
         Various provisions of the INA reflect Congress's intent 
to prevent the unwarranted separation of parents from their 
children.  For example, the INA provides an immigration 
preference for the alien children of permanent residents and 
United States citizens, 8 U.S.C.  1152(a)(4), 1153(a)(1) & (2), 
and children applying for permanent residency status from outside 
the United States receive the same priority date and preference 
category as that of their parents, 8 C.F.R.  
245.1(e)(2)(vi)(B)(1) (1996).  The INA also waives excludability 
for certain aliens who have helped their children enter the 
country illegally.  8 U.S.C.  1182(a)(6)(E)(ii).  See Lepe- 
Guitron, 16 F.3d at 1025. 
         The BIA's interpretation of "domicile" as it applies to 
children is plainly inconsistent with the term's customary 
meaning. Moreover, the BIA's restrictive interpretation violates 
the principle that ambiguous deportation provisions should be 
construed in favor of the alien.  See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 
U.S. 421, 449 (1987); Costello v. INS, 376 U.S. 120, 128 (1964); 
Rosario, 962 F.2d at 225.   We therefore decline to defer to its 
construction in this instance.  
         Having concluded that the domicile of a minor child may 
follow that of his or her parents in appropriate circumstances, 
the issue arises as to which parent's domicile should be 
determinative.  At common law, the domicile of a child born in 
wedlock followed that of the father, while an "illegitimate" 
child assumed the domicile of the mother. See Restatement 
(Second) of Conflict of Laws  14(2) (1988); Holyfield, 490 U.S. 
at 48.  In Rosario, the court of appeals declined to follow the 
common-law definition of "domicile" to the extent that it relied 
upon the marital status of the child's parents for purposes of 
section 212(c), and decided instead that a minor should be 
permitted "to establish domicile through a parent with whom he 
had a significant relationship during the time in question."  962 
F.2d at 224.  We agree with the Rosario court that such an 
approach better serves "the ameliorative purpose of  212(c)."  
Id.  It is more consistent with Congress' concern with keeping 
families intact, reflected in the other provisions referred to 
above, to have the imputation of a child's domicile turn on the 
nature of the relationship between parent and child rather than 
on the status of the parents' relationship.  
         Of course, it does not follow that satisfaction of the 
seven year domicile requirement through the imputation of 
domicile of a parent to a minor child will alone warrant the 
waiver authorized by section 212(c).  The waiver power given by 
Congress to the Attorney General and delegated by the Attorney 
General to the BIA is a discretionary one.  Undoubtedly, the BIA 
will take various factors into consideration, such as the length 
of the alien child's stay in this country, the child's age, the 
reasons for the child's failure to satisfy independently the 
seven year lawful domicile requirement, and the nature of the 
child's relationship with the domiciliary parent.  For example, a 
child prevented from rejoining his or her parent in this country 
because of the outbreak of hostilities abroad may be treated 
differently than one who was separated from the domiciliary 
parent for a substantial period of the time at issue for other 
reasons. 
         In this case, there is no indication that the BIA 
exercised any discretion.  In addition, the record is 
insufficient to permit us to determine if Morel even established 
the requisite period of domicile through his mother.  Because the 
IJ and BIA decided that the date from which Morel's mother 
established a lawful unrelinquished domicile in this country was 
irrelevant for purposes of Morel's case, Morel was not given an 
opportunity to present evidence establishing the period of his 
mother's domicile or the nature of his relationship with her.  We 
will therefore remand for determination of these issues. 
 
                               IV. 
         For the reasons set forth above, we will grant Morel's 
petition for review and remand the matter to the BIA for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
         Morel seeks relief under section 212(c) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.  1182(c), which as 
germane here, provides that: 
         Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent 
         residence who temporarily proceeded abroad 
         voluntarily and not under an order of 
         deportation, and who are returning to a 
         lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven 
         consecutive years, may be admitted in the 
         discretion of the Attorney General without 
         regard to the provisions of subsection (a) of 
         this section. . . .  
Section (a) lists classes of aliens who shall be excludable from 
admission into the United States and Morel is excludable under 
that list by reason of his conviction for possession of cocaine.  
As written, section 212(c) cannot possibly apply in this case 
because Morel entered the United States in 1989 and, at least 
insofar as appears in these proceedings, never has "temporarily 
proceeded abroad" and, in any event, is not seeking to reenter 
the country.  In short, this case seemingly has nothing to do 
with section 212(c) as that section plainly deals only with 
exclusion of aliens.  Thus, a person of ordinary intelligence, 
not trained in the law, reading section 212(c) and given the 
facts of this case would conclude that Morel's petition is 
frivolous.   
         Why, then, is section 212(c) even in issue here?  The 
answer lies in the truth that I have come to know all too well, 
that in the arcane world of the law what seems simple and obvious 
often becomes complicated, particularly when a court thinks an 
act of Congress or of a legislature is unjust.  In accordance 
with that process, section 212(c) lost its obvious meaning that 
it was applicable only to exclusion cases in 1976 in the decision 
in Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976).  In Francis, the 
petitioner, Francis, had been convicted of a marijuana offense.  
He sought a review of a final order of deportation of the Board 
of Immigration Appeals entered against him, claiming that under 
section 212(c) he could apply to the Attorney General for 
discretionary relief from deportation.  Francis, however, faced a 
seemingly insurmountable hurdle because under the Board's policy 
of applying section 212(c) as written, he was not eligible for 
relief since he had not departed temporarily from the country 
after his conviction.  To surmount this hurdle, Francis contended 
that the distinction between aliens who left the country and 
those who stayed "lacks any basis rationally related to a 
legitimate governmental interest, and therefore, deprives him of 
the equal protection of the law."  Id. at 269. 
         The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with 
Francis.  While it did not fault the Board for its interpretation 
of section 212(c), and it acknowledged that the "authority of 
Congress and the executive branch to regulate the admission and 
retention of aliens is virtually unrestricted,"  532 F.2d at 272, 
it nevertheless concluded that "[r]eason and fairness would 
suggest that an alien whose ties with this country are so strong 
that he has never departed after his initial entry should receive 
at least as much consideration as an individual who may leave and 
return from time to time."  Id. at 273.  Thus, the court held on 
equal protection grounds "that the Board's interpretation of 
Section 212(c) is unconstitutional as applied to this 
petitioner."  Id.  Accordingly, the court remanded the case to 
the Board so that the Attorney General could exercise discretion 
under section 212(c).  In Matter of Silva, 16 I. & N. Dec. 26, 30 
(BIA 1976), the Board adopted the Francis ruling and apparently 
the Board has applied it nationwide ever since.  See, e.g., 
Katsis v. INS, 997 F.2d 1067, 1070 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 
114 S.Ct. 902 (1994). 
         We, of course, do not deal directly with the question 
the court considered in Francis, as the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service accepts the holding in that case and thus, 
as the majority notes, "does not now dispute the applicability of 
section 212(c) to deportation proceedings."  Typescript at 9.  
Although I believe that the Francis holding is questionable, I 
will accept the Francis court's conclusion that the distinction 
between aliens who leave and return and those who never leave 
denies equal protection of the law to the latter group.  But I 
cannot understand how the Francis court reached the conclusion 
that it was the Board's interpretation of section 212(c) that was 
unconstitutional.  Francis, after all, was not a case in which an 
agency with a reasonable choice between possible interpretations 
of a statute chose an interpretation that rendered the statute 
unconstitutional rather than valid.  Quite to the contrary, 
section 212(c), as written, clearly did not apply to Francis.  
Indeed, the Francis court, following the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit in Arias-Uribe v. INS, 466 F.2d 1198 (9th Cir. 
1972), acknowledged that "the Board's interpretation is 
consistent with the language of Section 212(c)."  Francis, 532 
F.2d at 271-72.  In the circumstances, there is no escape from 
the conclusion that, if the Francis court's equal protection 
holding was correct, it was section 212(c) itself and not the 
Board's interpretation of it that was unconstitutional. 
         This distinction is not semantic.  It is clear that a 
court should construe an ambiguous statute to be constitutional 
if such a construction is reasonable.  DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida 
Gulf Coast Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575, 108 S.Ct. 1392, 
1397 (1988); United States v. A.D., 28 F.3d 1353, 1358-59 (3d 
Cir. 1994).  But, because of the clarity of section 212(c), that 
principle could not have justified the court's remedy in Francisafter its 
finding that there had been an equal protection 
violation, as no reasonable construction could have saved section 
212(c).  Indeed, the court in Francis did not claim to be 
construing an ambiguous statute to be constitutional.  Rather, 
without explaining why its constitutional conclusions justified 
granting Francis the right to seek discretionary relief from 
deportation, the court simply granted him that right. 
         The problem with the Francis court's remedy is that it 
may be that the equal protection violation found by the court 
should not have led to the holding that Francis was eligible for 
relief.  Rather, the court instead should have invalidated 
section 212(c).  Then Congress could have determined whether to 
apply section 212(c) in deportation cases or whether relief under 
the section would not be available in either deportation or 
exclusion cases.  After all, as we explained in Fields v. 
Keohane, 954 F.2d 945, 950 (3d Cir. 1992), a court cannot 
invalidate a law on constitutional grounds and create in its 
stead a law that the legislature, in this case Congress, would 
not have enacted.  The Francis court, however, upon finding the 
equal protection violation, rewrote section 212(c) to apply far 
beyond its written bounds.  Board Member Appleton correctly 
assessed what happened in his concurring opinion in Silva:  
"Section 212(c) has now been judicially rewritten. . . .  This 
may be desirable, but it is not what Congress wrote, nor what it 
intended."  Silva, 16 I. & N. Dec. 26, at 31-32.  I emphasize 
that in rewriting section 212(c) the Francis court did not merely 
invalidate an exception and leave the basic statute in place.  
The court wrote a new law which applied to a class of persons, 
i.e., aliens subject to deportation, that Congress never 
mentioned or intended to benefit in section 212(c).  Thus, the 
court reached what it thought was a just result and section 
212(c) lost its obvious meaning. 
         The Francis court's rewriting of section 212(c) has had 
far-reaching consequences.  It appears from the reported cases 
that the section now is applied in most instances to aliens who 
have not left the country following their criminal convictions.  
See, e.g., White v. INS, 75 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 1996); Graham v. 
INS, 998 F.2d 194 (3d Cir. 1993); Katsis v. INS, 997 F.2d at 
1070; Chiravacharadhikul v. INS, 645 F.2d 248, 249 (4th Cir), 
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893, 102 S.Ct. 389 (1981); Castillo-Felix 
v. INS, 601 F.2d 459, 462 (9th Cir. 1979).  Thus, Congress passed 
a statute intended for use in one situation that now appears to 
be used principally, perhaps almost exclusively, in another.  
Inasmuch as the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress 
and not the courts the remedy in Francis, to put it mildly, is 
disturbing. 
         Yet, I will accept not only the equal protection 
conclusion in Francis, but the remedy that the Francis court 
provided, i.e., applying the statute to aliens who did not leave 
the country after their criminal convictions.  Because the INS 
does not challenge the appropriateness of the Francis remedy I 
have no other choice.  Yet it is fitting to consider the problems 
with the Francis decision in an analysis of the issue at hand. 
         While the Board has acquiesced in Francis, it has 
adopted an interpretation of section 212(c) that requires that 
Francis be applied within reasonable boundaries, as it has held 
for 40 years "that an alien's lawful domicile begins to accrue 
only after lawful admission to this country for permanent 
residence."  Graham v. INS, 998 F.2d at 195.  See also Madrid- 
Tavarez v. INS, 999 F.2d 111, 112 (5th Cir. 1993) ("For the last 
forty years, the BIA has interpreted this language as requiring 
that to be statutorily eligible, the alien must have been a 
lawful permanent resident of the United States for at least seven 
years prior to his or her application for  212(c) relief.").  
Other courts of appeals have upheld this interpretation.  
SeeChiravacharadhikul v. INS, 645 F.2d at 250; Castillo-Felix v. 
INS, 601 F.2d at 467 ("For this reason, and because of the 
deference which we must give to the INS' longstanding and 
consistent interpretation, we hold that, to be eligible for  
[212](c) relief, aliens must accumulate seven years of lawful 
unrelinquished domicile after their admission for permanent 
residence.").  As far as I am concerned the administrative 
interpretation is correct, as section 212(c) should be read as a 
whole with the terms "permanent residence" and "lawful 
unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years" relating to 
each other. 
         One would think that it scarcely need be stated that 
ordinarily the courts owe deference to an administrative 
interpretation of a statute.  See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 
2881-83 (1984).  As the Supreme Court recently has indicated, 
while a statute's plain meaning must be given effect, "[w]hen the 
legislative prescription is not free from ambiguity, the 
administrator must choose between conflicting reasonable 
interpretations [and] [c]ourts, in turn, must respect the 
judgment of the agency empowered to apply the law to varying fact 
patterns."  Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 116 S.Ct. 1396, 1401 
(1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).  If there ever was a 
case for Chevron deference, this case is the one.  We deal here 
with a statute that reasonably can be read to support the Board's 
position.  Furthermore, the Board does not ask us to approve a 
new interpretation.  Rather, we are urged merely to approve an 
administrative interpretation followed consistently for many 
years and, significantly, adopted by other courts of appeals.   
         It is also important to recognize that Congress in 1990 
amended section 212(c) by narrowing the class of aliens who could 
be admitted at the discretion of the Attorney General by 
excluding from it aliens convicted of one or more aggravated 
felonies for which the alien served a term of imprisonment of at 
least five years.  See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101- 
649,  511(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5052 (1990); Scheidemann v. INS, 
83 F.3d at 1519-20.  The Board's approach in construing section 
212(c) is in harmony with Congress's action in limiting the class 
eligible for relief under that section.  Congress has continued 
to manifest a restrictive approach to criminal aliens.  Thus, in 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-132,  440 and 441, 110 Stat. 1214, 1278-79 (1996), 
Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality Act to expand 
the list of crimes constituting deportable aggravated felonies 
and to provide for expedited deportation of criminal aliens who 
have served their sentences.  To me the congressional intent with 
respect to criminal aliens is clear and I think the Board's 
interpretation of section 212(c) accords with Congress's 
approach. 
         It is also significant that we deal with a case in 
which, as I have explained, the statute is being applied to allow 
relief to a class of litigants Congress never intended to be 
eligible for relief.  Consequently, it is all the more 
appropriate for us to defer to the Board's interpretation that 
limits the eligible persons within that class.  After all, as I 
have pointed out, no reasonable person could read the words of 
section 212(c) and interpret them to mean that Morel can be 
eligible for the discretionary relief afforded by the section.   
         I find it ironical that the majority rejects Chevrondeference in 
this case on the theory that the "plain language" of 
section 212(c) demonstrates the "explicit" intent of Congress.  
Typescript at 14-15.  The absolutely undeniable truth is that if 
we apply the plain language of section 212(c), we will uphold the 
Board and deny Morel's petition.  While I understand why, if we 
follow Francis, we do not apply the plain language of section 
212(c) and limit the section to exclusion cases, our refusal to 
do so is, for the reasons I have stated, an additional 
justification for declining to upset a long-standing 
administrative practice which is supported by other courts of 
appeals.  
         Finally, the Board's interpretation makes sense.  It is 
clear that Congress required the seven-year domicile because it 
wanted to confine the opportunity to apply for discretionary 
relief under section 212(c) to persons with a substantial 
connection to this country as demonstrated by their lengthy 
presence.  Morel came into this country on December 20, 1989,  
committed his drug offense in August 1991, and was convicted on 
January 6, 1993.  Morel's attorney admitted at oral argument, as 
the logic of his argument required, that if we accepted his 
position, then an alien who committed a crime immediately upon 
entering the country could be eligible for discretionary relief 
as long as the alien satisfied the seven-year domicile 
requirement.  Can anyone really believe that Congress intended 
that by the use of an imputed domicile an alien with only such a 
fleeting connection to this country should be eligible for 
section 212(c) relief?  Morel's 20-month stay in this country 
before he committed his crime is not much more substantial.   
         In closing, I reiterate that I do not understand why we 
do not follow a consistent, reasonable, long-standing 
administrative interpretation that has been approved by other 
courts of appeals and which is in harmony with the congressional 
approach to criminal aliens, and hold that Morel is not eligible 
for section 212(c) relief because he had not been a lawful 
permanent resident of the United States for seven years before 
applying for that relief.  In view of the language of section 
212(c), it is clear beyond doubt that the denial of the 
opportunity to Morel to apply for discretionary relief will 
further the will of Congress, whereas making him eligible for 
discretionary relief will frustrate that will.  Accordingly, I 
dissent and would deny the petition for review. 
 
                                       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
